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Abstract  
The managed health care system (MHCS) was introduced and applied in Hungary between 
1999 and 2009. The gradually expanding system covered only 22% of the population and 
included exclusively the curative-preventive health care, subsidy on medicaments, subsidy on 
therapeutic appliances and the spa service. Like anywhere else it was cost-effectiveness that 
was expected from the MHCS without the adverse effect in the quality of the health service. 
To decide whether the MHCS was successful in Hungary or not, we compare it with the 
results of those segments of the health system where the MHCS was not introduced. We use 
the method of the incremental cost analysis. We are making our comparison exclusively on 
the basis of health economics aspects, because no difference has evolved in the quality of the 
medical attendances. We will see that where the MHCS was applied, the medical attendance 
became cheaper, at those places where the MHCS was not applied the medical attendance 
became more expensive, causing a chronic financial deficit (137785 million HUF). Although 
the MHCS managed from less money, it gained 17767 million HUF during the mentioned ten 
years. We are going to present the general features of the MHCS and support the fact that the 
outcome of the managed care concept was rationalized and the savings in several segments of 
health care, by means of empirical evidence. 
 
JEL (Journal of Economic Literature): 
managed health care, resource allocation, strict/soft budget constraints, efficiency, health and 
economic development 
 
Inroduction 
After the regime change of 1989 in Hungary the healthcare system had to face a lot of new 
challenge, which were mainly financing problems (Orosz, Ellena, Jakab 1998; Waters, 
Horbat, Forrest 2008; Fuchs, Emmanuel 2005). The solution was seen in that the state 
dominance had to be reduced and had to replace it with market and quasi-market mechanisms 
in certain parts of the health care (Csonka 2004). It was thought that the soft budget constrains 
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causing continuous financial deficit could be fortified with these measures (Kornai 1998, 
Kornai, Maskin, Roland 2003). As a consequence of this the MHCS operating on the quasi-
market basis was introduced in 1999, and was started up on the basis of the synthesis of the 
American Health Maintenance Organization and the English General Practitioner 
Fundholding institutional models (Mihályi 2003a, 2003b; Saltman 2008). Therefore this was a 
typical Hungarian managed health care system (MHCS). 
 In this study we are going to analyze shortly how the MHCS worked in Hungary, what 
kind of financing method was elaborated, what kind of functions the general practitioners and 
the case managers had. Following this we are going to analyze what kind of cost effectiveness 
the Hungarian MHCS resulted in. We are going to ascertain this while comparing the 
financial balance of the participants in the MHCS with the financial balance of the health care 
system outside the MHCS. We are going to call the latter sector as public health system (PHS) 
for the sake of simplicity. (It might be a little misunderstanding to use this category; however 
we stay at this abstraction, because we think this conveys the most, that in this system the 
MHCS was not used at all, none of the methods of the managed care can be discovered in it.) 
We will see that where the MHCS was introduced profit could be gained in every year, while 
in the PHS the financial deficit came to stay. 
 
Methods 
In this study we used the data of the National Health Insurance Fund Administration (NHIFA) 
and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), the reports of the State Audit Office of 
Hungary (SAOH) and the closing accounts of Ministry of Finance (MF). We are comparing 
the efficiency of the MHCS and the PHS with the method of incremental cost analysis 
concerning the period of 1999 and 2009 (Tunsater, Moutakis, Borg, Persson 2007).  
 First of all we will ascertain the difference between the income and the costs of the 
MHCS. From this we can find out how much saving they could bring to book in every year. 
As the MHCS could get more resources during its operation than the PHS, hence we can 
determine the annual profit of the MHCS as a difference of the saving and the extra income, 
after that we compare the balance of the MHCS and the PHS, this way we will find out which 
of them was more cost-effective. 
At the first sight it seems to be an easy mission, but it is not, because neither of the 
institutions in Hungary collected the statistics concerning the MHCS. As a consequence of 
this we had to collect the part data could be found at the above mentioned institutions, which 
very often measured the results of the MHCS in a different way. We had to integrate these 
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statistical data and we had to give coessential meaning for certain abstractions. Just one 
example from the many: the budgetary year lasted from 1 October of the certain year till 30 
September of the next year in the MHCS. The budgetary year in the PHS was different; it was 
the same as the calendar year. In many cases we had to face that the balance of the MHCS 
was given in the calendar year and they neglected the budgetary period concerning them. This 
way the balance of the cost and income did not accord in the data bases of the different 
institutions. We had to unify these data bases in the content to be able to start this work at all. 
It made our work even harder that a lot of data in connection with the MHCS are secret, 
therefore we can present only the public and free accessible data. 
 
Results 
On the basis of the synthesis of the English and American models the MHCS was introduced 
in Hungary between July 1999 and January 2009. The system operating on a regional basis 
was at the beginning applied only as a pilot model. As a result of the quick successes the 
number of the members was increased year by year (1 table).  
 
TABLE 1- General features of MHCS 
Year Number of 
beneficiaries 
Share of 
beneficiaries to 
total population 
Number of case 
managers 
Number of GPs 
 
1999 158.984 1.55% 9 103 
2000 199.882 1.95% 5 133 
2001 475.646 4.68% 7 298 
2002 476.531 4.68% 11 298 
2003 968.788 9.55% 11 635 
2004 1.888.574 18,62% 18 1240 
2005 2.279.513 22.57% 16 1495 
2006 1.689.927 16.77% 12 1090 
Source: National Health Insurance Fund Administration, State Audit Office of Hungary, Ministry of Finance, 
and Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
 
To join the MHCS the general practitioner had to submit his/her joining application to the 
NHIFA. If the NHIFA accepted it, the patients belonging to the general practitioner got into 
the system automatically. This was the cause why the MHCS was not successful, because it 
hurt the right to the free choice of the patients connecting to the health care. The patients were 
not questioned whether they would have liked to join or not, the decision was only in the 
general practitioners’ hand. However, the MHCS broke the law on the handling and 
protecting health and personal so the government ceased to finance and operate it between the 
years of 2007 and 2009.  
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The goals of the Hungarian MHCS were the working out of the aspects of the unique 
quality assurance, the increase of the cost efficiency, the development of the IT services, the 
development of the information technology needed to analyze patient paths, more liberal and 
more rational resource allocation, the increase of the health gain and finally to extinguish the 
parallel attendances and examinations. From a health-economics point of view the most 
important was to improve the health status of the population while placing the cost 
effectiveness in the foreground. The general practitioner’s and family paediatrician’s service 
(GP), spa treatments, dental services, subsidy on therapeutic appliances, transport of patients 
(from 2004), subsidy on medicaments, outpatient care, inpatient care, home special care, 
dispensaries (from 2004, including pulmonary dispensaries, dispensaries of dermato-veneral, 
psychiatric dispensaries, addictology dispensaries), dialysis, CT and MRI were classified as 
services involved into the MHCS. To accomplish these, the most important instruments were 
the following: to put the prevention in the foreground, to define the unique service protocol 
and to fortify the interactions between the GPs. 
The operating mechanisms of the Hungarian MHCS were based on the policy of quasi 
competition, which meant that the financing remained the task of the state, however the 
relationship between the supply and the demand became decentralized, and this was 
determined by the power relations of the market, to be more precise by the managed 
competition (Le Grand 1992).  
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Figure 1. Structure and financing of MHCS 
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Source: Boncz, I., Nagy, J., Sebestyén, A., Kırösi L. (2004). 
 
The savings were not evolved from the deficit or bail out, save (we share the details under), 
but were originated from rational economy and saving. The failures of the market were 
corrected by state intervention; the governmental failures were recovered with market 
solutions (Zuiderent, Grit 2010). This way it was possible to harmonize successfully the 
regulatory and incentive functions between the market and state systems (Le Grand 1991). 
These did not extinguish each other’s effectiveness, conversely, they complemented each 
other, enhancing each other’s strength and softening each other’s weaknesses (Paulus, Made, 
Mur-Veman 2003). 
In the operation of the MHCS the GP had a central function. The patient had to – if the 
character of his/her illness and the conditions made it possible – meet first his/her GP in the 
process of his/her cure. If the patient had to be sent to a further level of the medical 
attendance, it was ordered by the GP, by this the unnecessary and parallel treatments 
disappeared, this way the GP saved the system and all its characters from the extra costs. “The 
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core idea of the US managed care model is that HMOs collect a fixed fee from voluntarily 
registered clients and offer a pre-defined health care package in return to this population. This 
is a combination of both insurer and provider. In the UK system, as defined by the NHS 
Community Care Act 1990 GP fundholders were doctors working in general practices (family 
doctors). The individual GPs opted for his/heir practice to manage its own funds, rather than 
controlled by a local health authority. The size of the fund was calculated on a per capita 
basis, using past experience for a large pool of hundreds or thousand people. The success of 
both models derives primarily from the rigorous management of doctors, the control of 
referrals, the use of protocols, aggressive case and cost management.” (Mihályi 2003a: 10) 
Accordingly the GP led the patient path with his/her gate-keeper function, reducing the 
further costs originating from the asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970). “Financially, the 
budget of the co-ordinator is defined according to the population covered, rather than the 
extent of the service provided, as under a classical HDG mechanism. In addition, the co-
ordinator has discretion in the use of any surpluses; these, for example, can be used for 
remuneration or investment purposes, thus providing incentives for efficiencies in the 
coordinator’s own activities as well as the providers it contracts with. As elsewhere, a key aim 
in introducing managed care is to induce efficiency gains through better co-ordination 
between primary and secondary care, notably through better “gatekeeping” by doctors.” 
(OECD 2005: 79) 
The general practitioners had an automatic incentive to save, originating from the nature 
of the system, because they had a share from the savings. They received thorough information 
about patient paths and had an important function in prevention. Their role and prestige 
increased in the MHCS. Outpatient departments also had their share from savings, which 
facilitated an internal control, the cooperation with general practitioners brought about 
external control for them. Hospitals also received support from the savings as they were also 
taking part in the healing process. A sharp decrease in moral hazard was the most prominent 
in this field. Patients also preferred the MHCS, because prevention was emphasized. Local 
governments also supported the MHCS, since it took over several of their tasks automatically. 
This relation-system induced incentives in maintaining and financing managed care for each 
participant. The introduction of the MHCS created managed competition and yet, equity was 
still dominating as opposed to competition and efficiency. As every participant was interested 
in realizing savings, and the treatments prescribed did not result in overuse or underuse of 
health care services. 
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The other main character of the MHCS was the case manager, who was interested in the 
optimalization of the patient paths. The case manager accomplished the provider and 
financing function - the insurance stayed at the NHIFA – these two were not separated in the 
MHCS. 
The basic task of the case manager was to allocate the savings in a reasonable way, to 
strengthen the outpatient care, to decrease the numbers of the treatments enlisted unduly, to 
execute the control of the patient paths. From 2004 the case manager’s function was 
concretized and completed by a measure. According to this the provision manager’s main 
tasks were the coordination, the composition of the prevention reports, the management of the 
amount arriving at the virtual account, to establish and maintain further managed care 
institutional units at their territory, to establish the requirement system of the quality 
assurance and finally to complete its obligation to provide data towards the NHIFA. 
 The case manager fell out of the system together with the patients if he/she produced 
deficit during three consecutive months. The case managers could achieve a surplus in 
income, deferring in rate, which they allocated in the health care system. The amount of 
savings showed high deviation by regions, the reasons for which have not been recovered by 
thorough empirical analysis. To deal with the end-of-the-year losses made by some case 
managers, a special fund was set up in 2003. It fully compensated for the losses of the case 
managers who could not save from their resources. The fund contained equalization grants. 
The tasks of the case managers were regulated by law, not shaped by the processes of the 
market. Their most important task was to provide the population with the highest level of 
health care services from the amount in their virtual currency account. The fact that the 
country was divided into regions made it possible for local health care problems to come forth 
and these problems were dealt with adequately. In the Hungarian MHCS the case managers’ 
role was to provide services and organize, while the role of NHIFA was financing. The case 
managers’ duty included: the thoughtful allocation of savings, consolidating the outpatient 
service, cutting back on the number of unjustified treatments, working out a control system 
for tracking patient paths. A regulation in 2004 specified and also expanded the case 
manager’s function. According to that, the case managers’ main tasks were coordination, 
writing prevention reports, handling the virtual currency account, creating and managing new 
managed care organizations, setting up requirements for quality management, and they also 
had to send the required data to NHIFA.  
 Also called compensatory fund was established in 2003, it was a special financial fund 
to handle the incidental loss of the case managers at the end of the year. From this fund the 
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loss of those case managers was compensated who could not gain saving from the income 
resources. Therefore the competition did not abolish the solidarity among them. 
 The case manager had a so called “virtual account”, to which the NHIFA transferred 
the amount determined by the financing formula based on the risk adjusted quota, from this 
amount they had to finance and develop the health care for the patients belonging to them. 
This was the name of the case manager’s special accountancy. If he/she reached saving at 
his/her virtual account at the end of the year, according to the law this amount could have 
been paid out, which was real money. 
The amount of the quota was modified in every year, it was determined as the 
following. First of all those data were collected that actually can be used from the same period 
of the previous year (the number of population in the distribution according to sex and age). 
These could be easily procured from the database of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
Following this the population drawn into the MHCS was divided into 8 age groups on the 
basis of sex, and then they ascertained how much the general practitioners had spent on the 
certain sex and age group in the same period of the previous year. To calculate precisely the 
quota, an index number was created, which was counted on the basis of the ratio of the real 
payment and the estimate of the certain health care in the previous year (final payment 
divided by the amount of the estimated future payments). Separate index number was 
assigned to each group based on the sex and age. Finally the certain index numbers were 
assigned to the categories divided into sex- and age groups, this way they got the final 
indexed head quota. 
From 2005 the finance of the dialysis was made in retrospective form. This meant that 
8 age group. 2 sex and 2 dialysis variables were effective, therefore the financing chart of the 
MHCS could have been divided into (8x2x2=32) 32 cells. The financing based on the quota 
was counted on the basis of retrospective calculations. 7,5 % of the amount devoted to the 
treatments belonging to the dialysis gist was expended on acute dialysis and 92,5% of it was 
expended on chronic dialysis – these two were financed on the basis of different quotas. 
 The most important aim of the case manager was to organize the best level of health 
care to the population from the amount that could be found on his/her account. The most 
important difference between the MHCS and the PHS was that if the case manager saved 
money well, certain rate of the saving could be invested in the system. Therefore the saving 
was not taken out of the health care system, but it was spent on modernization and innovation. 
 Even in the first few months some profit disappeared on the virtual account of most of 
the case managers, which came to stay with bigger or smaller differences. There were also 
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that kind of case managers, who demonstrated deficit, but the average made profit at every 
end of the NHIFA year. (In the MHCS the budget lasted from the 1 October of the certain 
year to the 30 September of the following year.) We would like to emphasize again, that the 
MHCS gained its savings without adverse effect in the quality of the health care. 
 The source revenue of the MHCS included the following items: the amount on the 
basis of the risk adjusted capitation payment from the NHIFA, prevention fee, organization 
fee, organization fund, central budget extrafinancing, and other applications. The PHS was 
maintained from more resources than the MHCS and despite of this the PHS always closed 
the year with deficit, while the MHCS provided the care from less money and it could provide 
savings. In the MHCS the income from the NHIFA was determined according to the account 
formula based on the risk adjusted capitation payment (Nagy-Brandtmüller 2008).  
The total detachedness of the funds could be experienced in the PHS, which caused 
serious financial loss. However in the MHCS the separate funds were merged, the financing 
polarization was pushed into the background. If the money began to decrease from one of the 
funds and it could be foreseen that the other fund was not going to be emptied by the end of 
the budgetary year, money was regrouped in a rational way from one fund to the other to 
avoid deficit. For example if the money began to decrease in the subsidy on medicaments 
fund it was compensated from the fund for outpatient care. This financing logic did not work 
in the PHS (Boncz, Nagy, Sebestyén 2004). In some areas the fund had deficit, others had 
surplus that is why they had to be merged, this way the health care became managed, well-
organized, and could be financed and not necessarily needed more resources. The efficiency 
of the resource allocation increased rapidly in the MHCS (see 2. table). 
 
TABLE 2- Financing of the Hungarian MHCS (million HUF, 1 EUR= 295 HUF) 
NHIFA 
Year 
Revenue Expenditure Save 
Organization 
fee 
Prevention 
fee 
Organization 
fund 
Expenditure 
/revenue (%) 
Balance 
/revenue 
(%) 
1999 1774 1711 63 0 72,4 0 96,45 3,55 
2000 4402 3943 458 0 73,2 0 89,6 10,4 
2001 16691 15851 840 121,7 222,4 0 93,46 6,54 
2002 31042 28331 2711 101,3 227,6 0 91,27 8,73 
2003* 42512 41060 1452 64,1 279,7 1,1 96,58 3,42 
2004 34280 33025 1255 424,2 592,4 262,7 96,33 3,67 
2005 176661 172951 3710 643,3 1114 262,7 97,9 2,1 
2006 173993 169029 4964 104,4 311,8 0 89,99 10,01 
* in 2003 the saving dropped to such a great extent, because the ratio of new members increased sharply. They 
only had three months left to make a profit. It obviously proved to be too short time to boost savings. 
 
Source: National Health Insurance Fund Administration, State Audit Office of Hungary, Ministry of Finance, 
and Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
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Consequently the MHCS meant such a medical attendance organization where the integration 
of the finance of the services was worked out in 90%. According to this such resource 
allocation mechanisms could be used with the help of which the resources could be allocated 
more effectively among the different levels of the medical attendance 
In the MHCS prevention fees were given exclusively to those case managers who 
made a prevention plan at least one year in advance and they handled it to the NHIFA till 
March of the certain year. This was a quite detailed program, which contained not only the 
preventive aims, but also the equipments, methods, and budgetary plans belonging to that. If 
the preventive program was judged by the NHIFA as they could be achieved, the case 
manager received a prevention fee which exclusively covered the aims and equipments 
determined in the project. 
 First the amount of the prevention fee was 1000 HUF/ person/ year, but this amount 
was divided in 2001 and the case manager got 500 HUF prevention fee and 500 HUF 
organization fee each year after every patient (1 EUR = 295 HUF). According to the 
budgetary law in 2002 the preventive activity was changed again, the case manager was 
authorized only for an organization fee as much as 200 HUF/ person/ year. The prevention fee 
was granted for two years and the organization fee was granted for one year. The NHIFA 
granted the prevention fee quarterly and the organization fee monthly to the virtual account of 
the case manager. For 2005 the prevention fee was determined in 600 HUF/ person/year. 
 In the MHCS the organization fee was defined as an amount for the extra work 
occurring during the coordinating, organizing and planning work. The case manager was 
entitled to the organization fee if he/she completed the following activities: to develop the IT 
system, to support the establishment of the IT systems, to preserve the number of patients 
belonging to him/ her, and to increase the number of them, to retrieve the praxes joining later 
as new ones in connection with the data providing and the finance of the costs regarding to the 
sending the reporting obligations. The condition of the transfer was that the management as 
the head of the MHCS had to be full time workers. The acceptable spending of the 
organization fee and the prevention fee had to be proved by invoices to the NHIFA, and these 
invoices were controlled in every half year. The organization fee and the prevention fee were 
irrecoverably abolished from 1 January 2006 referring to the decrease in the resources. In the 
same year the medical attendance of the GP was taken out of the MHCS. 
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 Specifically the IT structure of the health care could be developed from the fund for 
the case manager and to maintain the stabilization of the number of people. During the 10 
years altogether 526.5 million HUF was put into this fund. 
 If the case manager had saving, he/ she could not keep all of it, only part of that. The 
allocation was ruled by law, and, of course, government. At the beginning if the 10 per cent of 
the income or less was saved in a year, only 80 per cent of the amount could be allocated, the 
remaining 20 per cent had to be remitted back to the NHIFA. If the saving reached the 10 per 
cent or it was higher, then the 80 per cent of the 10 per cent, and 50 per cent of the saved 
amount over the 10 per cent could be invested again into the MHCS. The reallocation had 
degressive rules to avoid the decrease in the quality of the patient care. The GP became 
interested not in increasing the number of people getting into the MHCS and curing them in a 
cheaper way, but was interested in that the population belonging to him/her should have 
stayed healthy by the preventive care in order not to require medical care. It is easy to see that 
the healthy man is not a financial burden for the health care system. 
 From 2007 the rules of the allocation was aggravated and if the case manager had 
saving as much as 10 per cent of the income or less, only 30 per cent of this amount could be 
allocated instead of the earlier 80 per cent. If the saving exceeded the 10 per cent, the 30 per 
cent of the part up to the 10 per cent, and the 25 per cent of the amount above could be 
allocated instead of the earlier 50 per cent. This significantly reduced the quantity of the 
resources that could be allocated, with this in a logical way, the incentive also decreased. The 
interest system was restructured and motivation decreased. 
 Several studies criticized that in the MHCS it was not difficult for the case manager to 
save money, because he/ she ab ovo managed with more resources than the PHS. This 
statement is not true, namely they could save money thank not to the higher amount of 
support but to the more rational way of economy. The members of the MHCS gained their 
incomes from several resources, but their total value was less than the income of the PHS, 
which received money only from one institution, from the NHIFA. A lot of people think that 
the MHCS gained more money from more resources. Contrarily to this the fact was that 
although the MHCS got money from more places, it gained less money than the PHS. The 
PHS could not save money from the higher amount, it showed 137785 million HUF deficit in 
this period. Although the MHCS managed from less money, it gained 17767 million HUF 
during the mentioned ten years (3and 4 table). 
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TABLE 3 The health revenues per capita in MHCS and PHS (million HUF, 1 EUR=295 
HUF ) 
Total health revenues per 
capita in MHCS (HUF)        
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
General practitioner's and 
family paediatrician's 
service 3246,96 3621,6 3992,91 4997,1 3144,07 39,96 0 
Dental services 1032,05 1141,59 1588,01 936,26 846 1289,55 1623,79 
Dispensaries (from 2004)     109,44 177,5 227,32 
Outpatient care 5127,86 5914,37 7301,31 7570,95 5630,66 8947,03 11740,63 
Inpatient care 20160,77 22580,55 29826,15 28716,19 20098,04 32974,75 41074,9 
CT and MRI 720,36 786,92 830,84 1030,06 638,66 988,94 1277,25 
Dialysis 1005,02 1115,64 2561,38 2916,97 960,91 1489,06 1890,91 
Home special care 131,24 140,07 155,25 215,45 162,02 250,79 307,49 
Transport of patients (from 
2004)     364,3 544,17 661,14 
Subsidy on medicaments 13265,82 15128,47 22519,18 21919,46 15300,38 26547,17 38599,03 
Subsidy on therapeutic 
appliances 2244,84 2312 2854,74 3258,47 2561,85 3850,33 4991,13 
Spa service 232,7 366,9 451,36 405,72 289,45 423,7 549,56 
Prevention fee 728,42 467,57 477,61 288,71 313,67 448,7 184,5 
Organization fee 0 255,86 212,57 66,16 224,61 282,2 61,77 
Central budget 
extrafinancing 2966,25 832,97 938,44 1050,7 930,96 182,62 0 
Organization fund    1,13 160,2 262,7 102,5 
Total 50862,29 54664,61 73709,75 73373,33 51735,22 78699,17 103291,9 
Grand total from 2000 to 
2009       486336 
        
Total health revenues per 
capita in PHS (HUF)        
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
General practitioner’s and 
family paediatrician’s 
service 3312,8 3617,2 4166,3 5199,4 5269,1 5435,6 0 
Dental service 1309 1676 2065,9 2091,7 2141,7 2142,6 2168,7 
Dispensaries (from 2004)     1247,06 1378,88 1122,18 
Outpatient care 5113,9 6283,1 7326,6 8007,3 9850,1 11187,6 10802,3 
Inpatient care 21660,2 24332 28330,8 29912,6 36034 39327,2 38728,8 
Dialysis 1034,9 1129,6 1310,6 1591,1 1602,6 1673,3 1699,8 
Home special care 130,8 142,7 168,1 226,9 285,4 294,1 288 
Transport of patients (from 
2004)     743,59 802,78 748,31 
CT and MRI 716,8 772,3 876,3 1073,3 1038,1 1115,9 1102,8 
Subsidy on medicaments 15042,36 18545,63 21553,53 25467,21 35117,12 44627,07 46348,73 
Subsidy on therapeutical 
appliances 2265,07 2570,98 2981,46 3810,66 5223,83 5644,85 5158,08 
Spa service 297,98 391,62 414,5 438,21 590,77 608,65 615,62 
Total 50883,81 59461,13 69194,09 77818,38 99143,37 114238,5 108783,3 
Grand total from 2000 to 
2009       579522 
Source: National Health Insurance Fund Administration, State Audit Office of Hungary, Ministry of Finance, 
and Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
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TABLE 4 - Soft budget constraints in PHS, the health revenues and expenditures of 
PHS (million HUF1 EUR= 295 HUF, ) 
 
 
  
              
  
Revenues 
in 2000 
Expendi- 
tures  
in 2000 
Balance 
in 2000 
Reve- 
nues  
in 2001 
Expendi- 
tures  
in 2001 
Balance  
in 2001 
Revenues 
in 2002 
Expendi- 
tures  
in 2002 
Balance 
in 2002 
Revenues  
in 2003 
Expendi-
tures  
in 2003 
Balance  
in 2003 
Revenues 
in 2004
General practitioner's  
and family  
paediatrician's  
service 36607,7 36608,1 -0,4 41137,6 41137,6 0 45453,2 45453,1 0,1 58105,7 58105,7 0 60221,6
Dental service 10410,4 10410,2 0,2 12076,4 12076,4 0 16198,8 16198,8 0 20496,2 20496,2 0 20994,4
Dispensaries 
(from 2004) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10261,2
Outpatient care 51607 51620,1 -13,1 61260,1 61260,1 0 72923 72923 0 96528,7 96528,7 0 103475,4
Inpatient care 214199,6 214240,3 -40,7 240617 24617 0 274072,1 274072,1 0 286076 286076 0 370688,8
CT and MRI 7057 7057,7 -0,7 7842,1 7842,1 0 8492,2 8492,2 0 10734,6 10734,6 0 10668,9
Dialysis 10143 10143 0 11606,4 11606,4 0 13061,2 13061,2 0 15895,8 15895,8 0 16118,9
Home special care 1274,4 1274,4 0 1462,8 1462,8 0 1587,1 1587,1 0 2235,8 2235,8 0 
Transport of patients 
(from 2004) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subsidy on 
medicaments 141000 150751   147000 179464,6 -32464,6 153000 209033,1 -56033,1 278000 233796,01 44203,99 239904,9
Subsidy on 
therapeutical  
appliances 20582 20589   26001,9 25002 999,9 26654 28915,2   34956,7 34957,5 -0,8 
Spa service 2000 2986,33   2759 3951,9 -1193,9 3250 4020   5435 4464 971 
Total     -54,7     -32658     -56033     45714,19   
Source: National Health Insurance Fund Administration, State Audit Office of Hungary, Ministry of Finance, 
and Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
 
 
In the studied period both in the MHCS and the PHS, the most money was spent on subsidy 
on medicaments. Basically the reason was that the population began to turn toward the more 
expensive medicine and the price of these increased dynamically (Stargardt 2008). This 
tendency appeared in the MHCS too, but this occurred more vigorously in the PHS. The proof 
is that although the extent of the subsidy on medicaments had to be increased year by year in 
the PHS, their costs always exceeded the amount of the income, and this established the 
mechanisms of the soft budget constraints (Gulácsi, Dávid, Dózsa 2002). More money had to 
be spent on the subsidy on medicaments in the MHCS but here the cost did not exceed the 
income, they endeavoured to reserve the strict budget constraints (Kornai, 2008, 2009; 
Kornai, Eggleston 2001). Even though the preventive activities were strengthened, saving was 
gained in this fund, which increased the medicine consumption. The difference between the 
management of the subsidy on medicaments of the two systems has not been studied yet with 
empirical methods. We can state on the basis of the figures we have that in the MHCS the 
GPs prescribed rather the cheaper generic drugs to the patients, which kept price down, this 
 14 
way they had to spend less on subsidy on medicaments. This process has passed off in the 
PHS only partially. 
 
Discussion 
Saving could be gained in the MHCS because the participants were interested in it, because 
they received a certain part of the saving as an income, and they could spend another part for 
development and the rest had to be remitted back to the NHIFA. Modernization could be 
financed from this. However the PHS was not interested in the saving. Namely if it had had 
less cost than income it would have meant that it could have maintain its activities from less 
money, this way the NHIFA would have granted less money next year. The participants of the 
PHS were interested in making deficit, proving that they need more and more money and this 
way they increased the income of the next year budget. This is the typical practice of the soft 
budget constraints (3 table). In this finance system it was not a problem if deficit occurred 
because an institution on a higher level (usually the state) boil out it from the financial crisis. 
There is no limit which would cause problem to exceed, it is not obligatory to keep the 
financial discipline. The state is able to finance the emerging costs even for a long time. The 
overspending meant extra source for the PHS, this way it was interested in keeping this. This 
way it is understandable that in fact the deficit increased the income of the PHS, the saving 
would have decreased its income (Boncz 2006). This generated a totally different method of 
management between the MHCS and the PHS. In the MHCS the saving was the elemental 
interest of everybody, while the elemental interest of PHS was to plan the costs that way that 
it would exceed its income. A very important difference was between the MHCS and PHS 
that the method and logic of usage expected different management from the participants, the 
different interests set the two systems against each other. We have to see that both the MHCS 
and the PHS was financed by the state through the NHIFA but the PHS was managed on the 
basis of soft budget constraints, while the MHCS was managed according to managed 
competition, so on the basis of strict budget constraints. Both had the same goal, which is to 
keep as much money as they can, with applying totally different financing methods (Boncz, 
Sebestyén 2006). This situation caused conflict of the interests and tension between the two 
systems, as it is much easier and more comfortable to over plan the costs and to increase the 
income of the following year, than to gain saving by strict and orderly management. To 
reserve their interests, the participants of the PHS tried to push the MHCS to the background, 
and they succeeded. They achieved that the disadvantages of the MHCS were exaggerated 
and its advantages were understated in front of the public opinion (Rechel, McKee 2009).  
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 The MHCS was founded as a civil initiative; it was created to represent the interests of 
those who believed in the rational solutions and the reforms based on competition. Through 
the mechanisms of the managed competition they tried to achieve the improvement of the 
healthcare by savings and not deficit. This approach did not agree with either the concept of 
the management of the NHIFA or the Ministry of Health, the lobbyists of the PHS were 
stronger against the representatives of the MHCS. 
 With the financing method of the MHCS the resource allocation between the funds 
could be well controlled, the funds could be merged in the interest of a rational management. 
Cream skimming was not possible because according to the health care law nobody could be 
closed out of the health care in the MHCS (Barros 2003). In the MHCS it became obligatory 
for the case managers and the GPs to inform the insured patients belonging to them about 
their membership in the MHCS, and the patients had to declare whether they would like to be 
members of the MHCS or not. However the case managers did not fulfil their obligation this 
way, the finance of the MHCS ceased from the beginning of 2007, its practical operation 
ended, it existed for another two years only legally. The earlier remitted amounts, which 
remained at the case managers, had to be paid back to the NHIFA, and the MHCS was 
abolished according to an Executive Decree on 1 January 2009. We can affirm, however, that 
it is still rather difficult to introduce a health care system with western patterns into a post-
socialist country like Hungary. 
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